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We use unique case study data to analyze the behavior of top managers in a distinct executive
stock option plan. We gather extensive questionnaire data on the managers’ traits (e.g. on their
risk aversion, diversification, and volatility forecasts) and combine it with individual-level exercise
data. Our results show that the managers in our sample expect very low volatilities (compared with
historical estimates), are well diversified and modestly risk averse. This implies that the value-cost
wedge of options can be smaller than usually assumed. Options are exercised very early and in large
transactions. We provide results that suggest that exercise decisions vary with expected volatility,
managerial wealth, and mental accounting. In particular, we find that managers who expect lower
volatility exercise earlier. We show that this result is consistent with the predictions of expected
utility models using our managers’ survey parameters.
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1 Introduction
Executive stock options (ESOs) have important financial implications at both the level
of a company and the level of an individual. In many cases, the value of options granted
to an executive represents a significant proportion of the total compensation (see Hall
and Murphy, 2003). Despite its economic importance, little empirical research exists that
examines the behavior of employees and managers in stock option programs. This lack of
research is primarily due to the difficulty of obtaining data on individual-level behavior. As
we will explain later, identifying the behavior of individuals in ESO programs is, however,
of central importance if one is to adequately understand the implications of their use.
In this paper, we offer an empirical contribution to the understanding of managerial be-
havior in ESO plans and to the efficiency of stock option grants in general. We therefore
study (i) how managers exercise stock options, (ii) how they dispose of company stock
acquired in stock option programs, and (iii) which individual characteristics explain differ-
ences in observed exercise activity. In particular, we hereby study the volatility estimates
of managers and how they affect their exercise behavior and the value-cost wedge of op-
tions. The value-cost wedge of options is the difference between the (subjective) value an
executive assigns to his options and the cost of the options to the issuing company.
To investigate these issues, we use a unique and comprehensive data set on the behavior of
senior top managers in the stock option plan of one of Germany’s largest companies. We
combine detailed information on individual-level stock option exercises of the company’s
top managers with extensive questionnaire information on a wide range of individual-
specific characteristics, beliefs, and attitudes. We have further data concerning what the
managers did with the shares they acquired on exercise, and whether or not they sold a
stock investment that was required prior to the participation in the ESO program (the
so-called required stock investment, abbreviated RSI).1
The uniqueness of our data stems from its disaggregated, individual-level observations
and from the combination of exercise and survey data. Moreover, the data comes from
senior top managers and hence from important decision makers in a very large firm. To our
1For every ten options they receive, option recipients must buy one share of company stock.
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knowledge, this is the first empirical study in the academic literature on ESO programs
that can link individual behavior with manager-level data on risk aversion, stockholdings,
forecasted volatility or expected stock returns that are included in our sample. We use
survey methodology, as this allows us to accurately address our research questions. As our
study uses data on the stock option program of a single company, we are effectively doing a
case study, which has obvious pros and cons. We therefore concentrate on individual-level
determinants of behavior that show within-firm variation and do not study cross-sectional
firm characteristics and their influence on behavior. The case study environment allows
us to look inside the black box of a firm and to analyze finely tuned questions. That all
managers in our study worked under the same organizational environment and within the
same ESO plan is certainly an advantage of our research design, but it has the drawback
that we need to be careful with generalizations of our results. This is also the reason why
we consider our results as clinical evidence.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. Consistent with the ESO literature,
individuals in our data set exercise their stock options very early and in a few large trans-
actions. Most option recipients sell the shares acquired on exercise. Also, most managers
exercise for cash, thus reducing the exposure to company stock. Our survey data shows
that the individuals in our sample expect very low volatilities compared with historical
estimates. The average manager expects a company stock volatility of 6.8% over a seven-
month forecasting horizon, while the estimate for this period based on historical data
would be 30.3%. These low volatility estimates are remarkable, as they suggest that the
usually assumed high volatility estimates in valuation models (often 30%) might lead to
an overestimation of the size of the value-cost wedge. The overestimation of the wedge oc-
curs as high volatility assumptions imply a high risk of the final distribution payoffs of the
options leading to generally low subjective option values. Consistent with this intuition,
we can show that the average option valuation using our managers’ volatility estimates are
in fact close to the Black-Scholes value. We can also document that the managers in our
sample are only modestly risk averse and well diversified, further reducing the cost-value
wedge.
We provide some interesting and new results that suggest that individuals’ exercise de-
cisions can be explained by differences in their expectations of future volatility. In par-
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ticular, we offer evidence suggesting that managers who expect lower future stock price
volatility exercise their options earlier. This result holds for volatility estimates of both
company stock and the stock market as a whole. We show that this finding is consistent
with the predictions of expected utility models using our managers’ survey parameters
as inputs. Overall, our findings imply that (low) volatility estimates are a main driver of
early exercises.
With regard to other determinants of exercise decisions, we cannot detect that our mea-
sures of risk aversion and diversification (individuals’ holdings of company stock) are
related to exercise behavior. However, we have some indirect results for risk aversion.
Consistent with Lambert et al. (1991) who model a manager’s absolute risk aversion as
a decreasing function of wealth, we find that wealthier individuals exercise their ESOs at
later points in time compared to less rich ones. We also find some evidence that mental
accounting partially matters for exercise decisions. We perform various robustness checks
to account for non-response biases, liquidity and tax driven behavior as well as for herding
and information based exercises.
Our documented results on behavior in option plans are of relevance for several reasons.
First, understanding exercise decisions is important as they contain information on how
managers subjectively value the stock options they are holding. A stock option will be
exercised whenever an individual’s utility from exercising prior to maturity is greater
than the expected utility from continuing to hold the option. As discussed earlier, these
subjective option valuations are important as they can cause a significant deadweight
loss to the shareholders of the firm that is issuing the options (the value-cost wedge,
see Hall, 2003).2 Based on assumptions regarding managers’ risk aversion, diversification,
and future volatility, previous studies have shown that the deadweight loss can be up to
50% (see Hall and Murphy, 2000, 2002). If one wants to better understand the efficiency
of granting stock options and the deadweight losses they can cause, one needs to better
understand how individual traits (such as volatility estimates or risk aversion) affect option
valuations and the corresponding exercise decisions.
Second, arguments for the widespread use of stock options generally rest on their as-
2The opportunity cost is the value an outside investor would be willing to pay for the option (usually the Black-Scholes
value).
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sociated incentive effects. The duration of these effects depends heavily on the actual
exercise behavior of individuals. If options are exercised for cash very early (as shown in
this study), these incentive effects quickly disappear. Moreover, they might not last long
enough to justify the associated high economic costs of ESO programs to shareholders.3 A
better understanding of the determinants of individuals’ exercise behavior can therefore
be helpful in designing new stock option programs with robust incentive effects.
Third, theoretical models predict that the exercise behavior of an individual depends on
his risk-aversion, wealth, and company stockholdings (see Lambert et al., 1991 or Hall
and Murphy, 2000, 2002). However, due to data limitations it is still relatively unknown
whether the predictions of these models hold in practice. To test these models, individuals’
observed option exercises need to be linked with personal characteristics such as risk
aversion or the degree of diversification (as it is done in this study). Empirical insights
into the determinants of individuals’ actual behavior could then help to assess existing
theories and guide future modelling.
Fourth, from a practitioner standpoint, understanding the behavior of managers as well as
employees in stock option plans is crucial for estimating the accounting costs of options.
According to the Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123, companies expensing the cost
of stock option plans need to estimate the expected life of issued options as an ingredient
of classical option pricing models (see Hull and White, 2004). The expected life of ESOs
depends on when option holders actually exercise their options. A precise estimation of
the individual behavior can thus significantly reduce the accounting cost of ESO plans
to the firms in question. In a recent paper, Bettis et al. (2005) show that the failure to
adjust for observed exercise patterns can significantly overstate the cost of stock options.
Our study contributes to the more general literature on the efficiency of options grants
and to a small number of empirical studies on executive and employee behavior in option
plans. Core and Guay (2001) use aggregate exercise data and find that option exercises are
higher when the realizable value of an option on exercise captures a greater percentage of
the option’s theoretical Black-Scholes value. Work by Bettis et al. (2005) documents that
employees working for firms with higher stock price volatility exercise their options earlier
3See Marquardt (2002), Bettis et al. (2005) or Meulbroek (2001) for empirical evidence on how substantial the costs of
stock option programs can be.
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than those working for firms with lower volatility. In addition, more senior employees hold
their options longer than less senior ones. Heath, Huddart and Lang (1999) and Huddart
and Lang (1996) document that option holders exercise in a way which suggests that
they believe that short-term price trends will reverse (mean reversion) and that long-term
price trends will persist (trend extrapolation). The authors also find that exercise activity
increases immediately when the stock price exceeds the maximum level attained during
the previous year. Finally, Ofek and Yermack (2000) document that executives usually
sell nearly all of the shares they acquired on exercise.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background on the
behavior of individuals in ESO programs. The data, the ESO plan and the sample firm
are described in Section 3. It also contains a definition of the variables we use. The results
of our study are presented in Section 4 and 6. Section 7 provides robustness checks and
Section 8 concludes.
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2 Background on Individual Behavior in ESO Plans
This section provides (theoretical) background on the behavior of managers in ESO plans
and derives individual-level variables that are likely to be related with managerial exercise
behavior. In particular, it will sketch the effects of volatility estimates on subjective option
valuations and exercises.
Manager can neither freely trade or sell their stock options nor hedge away the implied
risks by short-selling company stock. Moreover, they are usually inherently undiversified
with their entire human capital invested in the company. The inability to hedge the risk of
stock options and the non-diversification will cause managers to value ESOs in a way that
systematically differs from that of well-diversified outside investors. Therefore, the value
managers assign to stock options will usually not equal the Black-Scholes value of a fully
diversified investor. It is important to note that the value a person puts on his options is
closely related to his exercise behavior. A stock option will usually be exercised whenever
an individuals’s expected utility from exercising prior to maturity is greater than the
expected utility from continuing to hold the option (see Huddart, 1994, Carpenter, 1998
or Bettis et al., 2005).
Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia (1991) and Hall and Murphy (2000, 2002) 2002 formally
show that risk preferences and endowments of individuals affect the valuation of stock
options. By using an expected utility framework, they define the value of an option as the
lump-sum payment (certainty equivalent) that makes an individual indifferent between
receiving this payment for certain and receiving the uncertain payoff that is induced by
holding the option. They hereby point out that an individual’s entire wealth structure
and risk preferences affect this subjective option valuation and sh. In consequence, this
implies that individuals who are more risk averse, who hold a larger fraction of wealth
in company stock, and who are less wealthy will exercise their options earlier compared
to less risk averse, better diversified and richer individuals. For the effect of wealth on
exercise behavior, Lambert et al. (1991) assume that the level of absolute risk aversion is
decreasing in managerial wealth.
It is well-established that stock price volatilities have a big impact on the value of stock
options. The volatilities that are expected by participants in a stock option plan should
7
hence also affect their respective valuations and exercise decisions. In the context of ESOs,
forecasted volatilities have two opposite yet simultaneous effects. On the one hand, a
higher expected volatility decreases value and leads to an earlier exercise decision as it
raises the firm-specific risk option holders are exposed to. But on the other hand, it also
increases value and leads to a later exercise decision because of the convexity in the pay-
off of a stock option. Ex ante, it is not clear which of the two effects should dominate
as it depends on a variety of other factors such as, for example, the moneyness of the
options or risk aversion (see Lambert et al, 1991). Whether the subjectively perceived
stock price volatility overall leads to lower or higher values, and equivalently to earlier or
later exercise decisions, thus remains an empirical question. As with forecasted volatilities,
expected future stock returns are also likely to matter for the exercise behavior in ESO
plans: more optimistic individuals who expect higher returns on company stock should
assign higher values to their options and should therefore also exercise at later points in
time compared to less optimistic individuals.
The firm-specific skills of a manager grow over time and have the positive effect of increas-
ing the productivity at the employing firm (see, e.g., Becker, 1964). However, firm-specific
skills are likely to be useless when the current job is terminated and when the manager
moves to another company. Although the firm-specificity of human capital is not formally
captured in ESO models, it is likely to affect exercise activity as well. More specifically,
one can expect that individuals with a more firm-specific human capital generally exercise
options earlier in order to diversify.
It has been documented that individuals use cognitive operations to organize and evaluate
financial activities. Thaler (1980, 1999) denotes this kind of thinking as mental accounting.
One aspect of mental accounting is that investors do not sufficiently integrate individual
assets into the rest of their wealth and focus on narrowly defined gains and losses (cross-
sectional narrow bracketing).4 Massey (2003) argues that the more narrowly an individual
brackets his ESOs (i.e. the less he integrates them into his total wealth), the lower his
valuation of these assets will be. Individuals who suffer from narrow bracketing should
hence exercise their options earlier compared to those who integrate their financial wealth.
4The valuation of gains and losses rather than absolute wealth levels is a central feature of prospect theory, see Kahneman
and Tversky (1979).
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An other aspect of mental accounting is that individuals often have myopic perspectives
when evaluating assets (temporal narrow bracketing).5 Benartzi and Thaler (1999) have
shown that this kind of myopia can lead to more risk averse decision-making. In the
context of stock options, this line of argument implies that individuals with more short-
term perspectives concerning stock price changes will generally regard options as being
less attractive. One can therefore expect that more myopic individuals will be more likely
to exercise their ESOs at an earlier date.
Overall, the provided arguments suggests that a set of variables appears to be relevant
in understanding individual-level behavior in ESO programs. Table 1 summarizes the
predicted relationships between these variables and managerial exercise behavior. One
possible approach to get a thorough understanding and explanation of actual exercise
patterns is to ascertain these variables empirically. A tractable way to perform this is to
distribute a questionnaire to option recipients of a particular ESO program. This is also
the approach we use in this paper. We believe that conducting such a survey is a very
promising way of effectively linking individual characteristics with personal-level exercise
data given that most of the variables discussed above are per se difficult to observe. Our
survey approach allows us to measure managerial characteristics directly without relying
on much more noisy and indirect proxies of these variables.
5See Kahneman and Lovallo (1993).
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3 The Institutional Set-Up and the Data
3.1 The Company and the Stock Option Program
Empirical research which looks inside firms to study individual behavior in stock option
plans is rare. Existing studies primarily look at aggregate exercise decisions of option re-
cipients in different corporations with different option plans and lack access to individual-
specific information. To get a deeper understanding of managerial behavior in ESO plans,
it is important to study the individuals acting in these plans in greater depth. Our objec-
tive is therefore to examine the behavior of managers in the ESO plan of one corporation
in detail. In particular, we analyze how well our exercise data can be explained with mea-
sures of the variables that were outlined in the previous section. We essentially conduct
a clinical study and, as a consequence, naturally concentrate on individual determinants
of behavior which show within-firm variation rather than on cross-company determinants
of behavior. This approach allows us to hold both firm and option plan characteristics
constant (variables which are difficult to control for in studies across different firms and
ESO plans).
Our data set contains information on the stock option exercises of the 70 most senior
managers in one of the largest German corporations. The data set includes detailed records
of all exercises of these individuals during the exercise period of the ESO plan (from May
2003 to September 2005). The stock options were granted between July and August 2000.
All managers belong to the highest management levels of the firm and are important
corporate decision makers. The company is one of the largest in its industry in Europe and
employs more than 50,000 people worldwide. Its turnover exceeded 7 billion Euro in 2005
and its shares are publicly traded. The company supplied the data on the condition that
it and its managers remain anonymous. During both the vesting and the exercise period,
no extraordinary firm-specific events (like bankruptcy or financial distress) occurred, that
might have triggered the exercise activity. Also, options on company shares were not
traded.
To avoid conflicts of interests with regard to insider information, the company decided that
the options were not exercisable on all days during the exercise period, but only within a
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few exercise windows.6 Each exercise window opened after the announcement of company
earnings and lasted for approximately four weeks. The ESO program encompasses eight
separate exercise windows in total. Initially, the strike price of the options was equal to
the arithmetical average of the stock price 20 days prior to the option grant (15 Euro),
with a conversion ratio of 1 (i.e. to buy one share of company stock at a price of 15 Euro,
one option had to be delivered). To avoid adverse effects on the stock price resulting from
a large number of option exercises with subsequent stock sales, the company reduced the
strike price from 15 to 3 Euro, and lowered the conversion ratio from 1 to St−15
St−3 (i.e.
a larger number of options had to be delivered to buy one share of company stock at
a reduced price).7 The program was designed such that the participants were allowed to
exercise all options at the same time (cliff vesting). They were prohibited from conducting
more than one exercise transaction per exercise window. Moreover, they were not allowed
to sell the RSI during the vesting period. At the beginning of the exercise period, the
stock price of the firm was 23 Euro.
3.2 Definition of Variables
As outlined above, we are able to combine our exercise data with comprehensive data on
individual-specific characteristics, beliefs, and attitudes that was collected by means of a
questionnaire. Furthermore, we have information on what each individual did with the
shares he acquired on exercise and whether or not he sold the stock investment that was
required prior to the participation in the ESO program. On May 14, 2004, between the
third and fourth exercise window, all individuals participating in the ESO plan received
a letter from us and were asked to participate in our questionnaire. 48 out of 70 option
recipients returned the questionnaire which results a response rate of 68.6%. A copy of the
questionnaire can be found in the Appendix. To avoid strategic and dishonest answers,
6Note that some firms grant new options just after executives have exercised existing options. This could potentially
affect the incentive to exercise early. However, this was not the case in our sample firm and exercise decisions were therefore
not affected by this granting practice.
7Ex post, the liquidity concerns of the firms were not justified. First, the shares of the sample firm belonged to the second
largest German stock market index (MDAX) and were very liquid. Second, the shares of the firm were widely dispersed and
showed no significant ownership concentration. Third, we have analyzed the share turnover data around the exercise dates
and did not find any abnormal turnover rates. Moreover, the share price did not drop around the exercise dates. Fourth,
even if the firm had kept its conversion ratio of 1, the turnover rate would remain within normal limits.
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we guaranteed that survey responses are treated confidentially and will only be used for
research purposes. In particular, we assured participants that neither the executive board
of the company nor their human resources department will be able to access the individual
answers.
3.2.1 Behavior Variables
The first three variables capture the behavior of a manager within the ESO plan. Imme-
diate exercise is a binary variable that reflects the exercise behavior of an option holder
and documents how early he exercised his options. It takes the value 1 if he exercised his
ESOs during the first exercise window. Correspondingly, it takes the value 0 if he did not
exercise during the first window.8 The variable is based on the exercise data provided by
the company.
When an individual exercises his ESOs, he acquires the underlying company stock and
pays the strike price. An option recipient can then sell these shares immediately to log in
the difference between the stock price at the exercise date and the strike price.9 Alterna-
tively, he may decide not to sell the acquired shares and keep them in his private stock
portfolios. To characterize the stock selling behavior of an individual, we use a binary
variable named acquired stock. It takes the value 1 if an individual sold his purchased
shares before the day of filling in the questionnaire (either by paying the strike price
and selling the shares or by cashless exercise), and 0 otherwise. The variable is based on
self-reported information collected by our questionnaire.
A variable that is closely related to acquired stock is denoted required stock investment.
Recall that before being granted his ESOs, each manager had to buy one share of company
stock for every ten options he received. All individuals were thus prevented from selling
these shares during the vesting period. From the inception of the vesting period onwards,
they were free to trade their initial stock investments. Required stock investment is a binary
8If options were exercised in more than one window, the variable takes the value 1 if the majority of options were
exercised in the first window.
9The immediate sale of shares can also be realized by ‘cashless exercise’, a procedure in which a brokerage firm delivers
the difference between the strike price and the market price at exercise to the individual. As documented by Heath et al.
(1999), cashless exercise is very common in stock option programs.
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variable which takes the value 1 if an individual had already sold his stock investment
(RSI) at the time of participating in our questionnaire, and correspondingly 0 if he retained
it. This measure is also based on self-reported information.
3.2.2 Variables on Managerial Characteristics
We have data on a wide range of managerial characteristics. We argued that risk aversion
can have a substantial effect on exercise decisions in ESO plans. We used a certainty
equivalence method to elicit individuals’ risk aversion (Question 9 in the attached Ques-
tionnaire). In this method, the participants were offered an uncertain prospect (a lottery)
and were asked to indicate the amount of a sure payoff that they would consider to be
equally attractive. The lottery was designed to have a 50% chance of winning an amount
equal to the current wealth of a person, and a 50% chance of winning nothing. The certain
payoff was a pre-specified and guaranteed change in wealth (e.g. a 30 or 40% increase in
wealth). We transformed the certainty equivalents into a risk aversion parameter assum-
ing a specific parametric form of the utility function. Following Lambert et al. (1991), we
work with a power utility function of the form u(x) = (1/(1−α))x1−α. In this parametric
form, α is a measure of an individual’s degree of relative risk aversion. Lower certainty
equivalents imply higher values of α and thus a higher degree of risk aversion.
To measure individuals’ exposure to firm-specific financial risk, we asked each option
recipient for the percentage of their total wealth that they currently have invested in
company stock.10 Stockholdings consequently reflects the value of a manager’s company
stock holdings divided by his total wealth. Managers at higher levels in a company receive
a larger number of stock options and also get a higher cash salary. They are therefore
ceteris paribus wealthier and have more opportunities to diversify wealth. As described
in Section 2, the value of an ESO is an increasing function of wealth. In our empirical
analysis, we use the number of options granted to an individual (options) as a proxy for
wealth.11 This information is based on the transaction data set provided by the company.
10See Question 1 and 2. We combined the answers to both questions multiplicatively to get a measure of a manager’s
total wealth invested in company stock.
11Each non-board member (board member) could obtain up to 10,000 (50,000) options. For every ten options, one share
of company stock had to be bought (see above). Given their personal financial constraints, individuals therefore had to
decide how many options they actually wanted to receive. See Subsection 4.2 for descriptive data.
13
Following May (1995) and Degeorge et al. (2004), we use tenure as a proxy for the firm-
specificity of human capital. Tenure is measured as the number of years a manager has
been working for the company (Question 12).
To measure our main variable of interest, the future volatility that is expected by the indi-
viduals in our sample, we asked each option recipient to provide lower and upper bounds
of 90% confidence intervals to two questions concerning stock index level forecasts and
to one question concerning the future price of company stock over a seven-month hori-
zon. Confidence interval questions are often used in the literature to elicit probability
distributions and volatility estimates of future stock returns.12 Following the widely used
methodology suggested in Keefer and Bodily (1983), we transformed confidence inter-
vals into volatility estimates.13 As volatility benchmarks, we use historical volatilities
of non-overlapping seven-month returns. Historical volatilities are often used as objec-
tive volatility benchmarks or as estimates for future volatility (see Graham and Harvey,
2002). Using historical volatilities as a benchmark is not without problems as they are
calculated over different time periods and longer horizons. However, “optimal” volatil-
ity forecast benchmark hardly exist (see Poon and Granger, 2004) and other approaches
such as looking at hit rates have other shortcomings (such as being ex post measures).
Therefore, historical volatilities are considered the most reasonable volatility benchmark
and are commonly used (see Glaser et al., 2007 or Graham and Harvey, 2002). Implied
volatilities of exchange-traded options on company stock were not available.
We use two measures for the estimated volatility: Forecasted volatility market is used to
measure the volatility an individual expects for the stock market as a whole.14 Forecasted
volatility company measures an individual’s volatility forecast for the company stock only.
Lower values of our volatility measures reflect tighter confidence intervals.
In order to investigate the impact of expected stock returns on managerial behavior,
we asked each option recipient to provide a median forecast for the values of the two
12See, for example, Glaser and Weber (2005), Klayman et al (1999), Biais et al. (2005), and Soll and Klyman (2004).
13Keefer and Bodily (1983) show that the following approximation provides a good estimation of the forecasted volatility
of a time series i: Volatilityi =
r(0.95)i−r(0.05)i
3.25
with i ∈ {DAX,Euro Stoxx 50,Company stock}, r(0.95) being the upper
and r(0.05) being the lower bound of the forecast (after transforming the level forecasts bounds into return forecasts bounds).
14It is constructed by calculating the arithmetic average over the volatility measures for the two market indexes DAX and
Euro Stoxx 50. If only one measure was available, we used this forecast to represent the market forecast of an individual.
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market indexes DAX and Euro Stoxx 50, as well as for the price of company stock (see
Question 3). For each individual, we transformed these price/index forecasts into median
return forecasts. We thereby constructed a measure of the general market optimism of an
individual (expected return market), and a measure of his optimism concerning company
stock (expected return company). Expected return market is calculated as the average over
the forecasts for the DAX and Euro Stoxx 50. Expected return company is simply the
expected return on company stock. All forecasts were made up to the end of the year
2004.
To assess the pervasiveness of mental accounting, we investigated whether the individuals
in our sample think of their stock options in isolation (narrow bracketing) or as part of an
overall investment strategy (asset integration). The resulting variable is denoted as narrow
bracketing (see Question 5). To explore the second dimension of mental accounting, we also
wanted to know how far ahead option recipients actually look when they consider their
stock options and possible future prices of company stock. Time horizon is a discrete
variable that takes the value 2 if a manager has a long-run perspective (two years or
longer), 1 if he has a medium-run perspective (three months up to one year), and 0 if
he has a short-run perspective (up to one month only) (see Question 7). In addition, we
have information on the hierarchy levels of the managers in our data set (see Question
13). Due to the fact that all option recipients were men, we did not account for gender
effects.




4.1 Descriptive Results on Exercise and Stock Selling Behavior
Summary statistics on the behavior of the managers in the ESO program are presented in
Table 3. Panel A provides descriptive results on exercise patterns. It reports the number of
individuals that exercised (the majority of ) their stock options in each of the eight different
exercise windows, the number of options exercised in the different exercise windows, and
the total number of exercise transactions per manager. Consistent with other studies in the
field, we find that early exercise is a pervasive and strong phenomenon in our sample.15 A
majority of the managers, 64%, exercised their options during the first window, reflecting
a strong propensity to exercise early. Within this group of immediate exercisers, 71% (32
out of 45) actually exercised their options even within the first three trading days. Early
exercise is also evident when we consider the fraction of options exercised in each of the
eight exercise windows. We find that the vast majority, 83%, exercised their options in
one large transaction.
Panel B reports statistics on the stock selling behavior. It shows that most individuals,
87%, sold the shares they acquired on exercise.16 This finding is consistent with other
results in the ESO literature (see, e.g., Ofek and Yermack, 2000). Having exercised their
options, most individuals seem to be aware of their diversification problems and convert
acquired shares into cash. To act consistently, individuals should also sell the shares
they purchased for the required stock investment (RSI). However, Panel B shows that a
significantly smaller percentage of managers, only 35%, did so. Hence a majority still ties
a significant proportion of their financial wealth to the value of the firm by holding RSI
shares.
Table 4 provides cross tables of the three transaction variables immediate exercise, ac-
quired stock, and required stock investment. Panel A shows that, conditional on immediate
exercise, 27 out of 30 option holders exercised for cash. Panel C again shows the differ-
15For similar evidence on early exercise, see, e.g., Bettis et al. (2005), Hemmer et al. (1996) or Huddart and Lang (1996).
16Shares were sold either immediately or up to the point in time when the questionnaire was returned. The vast majority,
91%, of shares was sold upon exercise.
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ences in the disposition of acquired shares vis-a-vis RSI shares. This might be due to the
fact that individuals regard shares acquired on exercise and RSI shares separately.
4.2 Descriptive Results on Questionnaire Data
Descriptive statistics on our questionnaire data are summarized in Table 5. Apart from
options, all variables were calculated on the basis of the 48 returned questionnaires. The
mean certainty equivalent for our presented lottery was a 25% increase in total wealth
(median = 25%, std. dev. = 16.4%), leading to a mean value of risk aversion equal to 0.49
(median = 0.50, std.dev. = 0.23). Models such as Lambert et al. (1991) usually assume
risk aversion parameters between 0.5 (not very risk averse) and 4 (very risk averse). This
shows that the individuals in our sample are on average not very risk averse and close to
risk neutral (which would be assigned a value of 0). The average manager has invested
2.9% of his total wealth in company stock (median = 1.75%, std.dev. = 3.04%), ranging
from 0.25% to 12.75%. As a fraction of his overall equity holdings, the average option
holder has put 25.3% into company stock (not reported in Table 5). This figure is in
line with the findings of other studies. Benartzi (2001), for example, documents that
employees invested 20-30% of their discretionary funds in company stock. Also note that
our measures of risk aversion and diversification show quite a bit of variability within our
sample (which is important for testing between group differences in managerial behavior).
On average, managers received 10,520 options (median = 10,000, std.dev. = 11,435), and
this number fluctuated between 1,000 and 50,000.17 The average individual had been
working for the company for 17.8 years (median = 15, std.dev. = 8.17).
We find that individuals’ volatility forecasts vary across the managers sampled but, unex-
pectedly, are on average very low. Our measures suggest that the average manager in the
company expects a market volatility of 5.8% over the next seven months and a volatility
of only 6.8% for company stock. Table 6 presents further details on the volatility esti-
mates. In particular, it compares these volatility estimates with historical volatilities. The
table shows that in all three cases, estimated volatilities are significantly below historical
17On average, individuals received 76.6% of the options they could obtain at maximum (median = 100%). Recall that non-
board members (board members) could obtain up to 10,000 (50,000) options, depending on personal financial constraints
to fulfill the RSI.
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averages. In the case of company stock, for example, the historical standard deviation of
non-overlapping 7 month returns is 30.3%, while the executives in our sample expect on
average a volatility of only 6.8%. There are two potential explanations for these findings.
First, the managers’ volatility estimates are very low by historical standards as they had
information for this specific and relatively near-term period that allowed them more ac-
curate forecasts. Consistent with this argument, Table 6 shows that the managers’ bound
estimates were relatively accurate when compared against actual stock price realizations.18
Second, the low volatility estimates might also be consistent with results on miscalibra-
tion in the overconfidence literature (see, e.g., Glaser et al., 2006). This literature has
shown that that individuals often underestimate future volatilities. Experimanetal stud-
ies have documented that executives, i.e. our group of survey participants, are particularly
vulnerable to showing this kind of bias.19
Table 5 further documents that our managers expect a stock market year-end return of
6%, and that the average manager predicts a return of 7.37% for company stock. Most
managers indicated that they think of their stock options in isolation (narrow bracketing),
not taking other existing stock investments into account (mean = 1.78, median = 1.00,
std.dev. = 1.56). This evidence for mental accounting is further reflected in the values
of our second mental accounting variable (time horizon): most managers have myopic
perspectives when evaluating company stock. Only three out of 46 top managers have
a long-run view regarding stock price movements. Most managers only consider periods
from between three months up a year in advance (35 individuals) or in some cases even
less then three months (8 individuals). Finally, the hierarchy levels of the responding
individuals look as follows: two belong to the management board, 19 to hierarchy level 2,
16 to level 3, seven to level 4 and three to hierarchy level 5.
18The very accurate inbound estimates might partially be due to the relatively low ex post volatility realizations over the
forecasting horizon (as one can see based on a comparison of the historical volatilities with the realized ones).
19See Moore (1977), Kidd (1970), and Larwood and Whittaker (1977). Overall, the interpretation of these “inbound rates”
is also limited as they are based on an ex post assessment of just one stock price/index realization.
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5 The Effect of Volatility Forecasts on the Value-Cost Wedge
and Option Exercises
5.1 Volatility Forecasts and Value-Cost Wedge Implications
The low volatilities estimates of the managers that were documented in the previous
section have implications for the value-cost wedge and hence the general efficiency of
stock option grants. Prior studies have shown that managers’ subjective option values
represent large discounts from Black-Scholes values. These studies almost always use some
relatively high volatility estimates to calculate subjective option values. However, these
high volatility estimates increase the risk of the final distribution of the option’s payoff
and cause a low certainty equivalent. These effects are particularly strong if managers
are very risk averse and poorly diversified. Hall and Murphy (2000, p. 211), for example,
document value-cost wedges of up to around 50% using a volatility estimate of 30%.20
To illustrate the effect of low volatility estimates on the value-cost wedge, we use the
individual volatility forecasts of the managers in our sample together with their risk
aversion, diversification and wealth parameters and calculate the implies subjective option
values.21 To compute these values, we apply the expected utility framework of Hall and
Murphy (2000, 2002). Besides the individual characteristics of the managers, we added the
time to maturity of the option, the exercise price, the market price of company stock, and
estimates of the risk free rate, the firm’s beta, and the equity risk premium as additional
model inputs. Using these parameters, the expected utility model predicts an average
(median) subjective option value of Euro 9.79 (Euro 9.91). The values are report in Panel
A of Table 7. These values are surprisingly close to the Black-Scholes value which equals
Euro 10.06 and is computed based on historical volatility. Using the (median) subjective
values, these figures imply a value-cost discount of only 2.7% (1.5%) which is below what
is usually assumed in the literature. In fact, recent evidence by Sautner and Weber (2008)
20In this specific example, a risk aversion parameter of 2 is assumed, and the the manager invests 66% of his wealth in
company stock. The corresponding subjective option value is USD 7.49 and the Black-Scholes value USD 16.55. This leads
to a value-cost discount of 54.7%.
21We measure the values for May 2003, the month when the exercise period started. In order to have a practical measure of
managerial wealth, we assumed that managers that received more options are also richer and for 10,000 options a managerial
wealth of 1,000,000 Euro. This implies that the average manager in our sample has a net wealth equal to 1,052,000 Euro.
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suggests that subjective option values can even exceed the Black-Scholes values under
certain conditions.
Overall, our results show that low volatility estimates, paired with modest risk aversion
and a reasonable diversification, can have the effect of significantly reducing the value-cost
wedge of ESOs and make them look more efficient from a shareholder’s perspective than
traditionally assumed.
5.2 Volatility Forecasts and Exercise Behavior
In a next step, we investigate to what extent the heterogeneity in forecasted volatility
can explain the differences in the observed exercise behavior across the individuals in
our sample.22 Table 8 compares individual-level variables for the group of managers that
immediately exercised their ESOs with those from the group that did not exercise imme-
diately (or that did not sell acquired shares). Recall that almost all of the managers who
exercised early did so right at the beginning of the first exercise window. We compare the
mean and median values the estimated volatility of the two groups and perform a non-
parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test (Mann-Whitney test) to test the hypothesis that the
values of the two sample medians are identical (the table also reports variables which will
be referred to later). This enables us to discriminate between the two groups and allows
us to investigate whether volatility differences or differences in other variables can explain
the heterogeneity in individuals’ actual exercise decisions.23 The way we construct the two
groups stems from the high immediate exercise activity in the first window. Overall, this
categorization works against us rather in favor with regard to finding significant between
group differences. Non-significant between group differences therefore do not necessarily
indicate that the insignificant variables do not matter but could also signal simply a lack
of power in our employed statistical tests.
The table shows that the group of immediate exercisers is forecasting significantly lower
volatility levels compared to the second group. The average manager in the immediate-
22In the next section, we will also look at the effects of differences in risk aversion, company stockholdings, and the other
variables that were described previously.
23Because of the limited size of our sample, we do not perform multivariate analyzes such as discriminant analysis or
probit/logit regression models that require much stronger distributional assumptions.
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exercise group estimates a company stock volatility of 6.19% while the average manager in
the latter group expects 7.66%. Our findings seem to be robust as our volatility measures
for the stock market as a whole show similar between-group differences. Given the size of
our sample, the significance levels are also relatively high.24
Theoretically, a higher expected stock price volatility has two simultaneous but opposing
effects on subjective option values and exercises (e.g., see Lambert et al, 1991). On the
one hand, it has a negative effect on option values and leads to earlier exercises as it
increases the perceived firm-specific risk option holders are exposed to. But on the other
hand, it also has a positive effect and leads to later exercises because of the convexity in
the payoff of a stock option. Depending on the magnitude of the two effects, differences
in forecasted volatility can lead to lower or higher option values and hence to earlier or
later exercise decisions. In our data, the documented underestimation of volatility seems
to have led to earlier exercises.25 This evidence suggests that managers who expect lower
volatilities put smaller values on the options’ time value and exercise earlier compared to
individuals who expect higher volatilities.
To complement these volatility findings, we directly calculated the subjective option values
for the two groups using the managers’ personal estimates of volatility and their other
characteristics as input variables. To compute these option values, we again applied the
expected utility framework of the valuation model by Hall and Murphy (2000, 2002).
Hereby, we used two slightly different approaches to calculate the implied option values
of the managers in the two groups.
In the first approach, we conducted the valuations using the median values of risk aversion,
diversification, and wealth for each of the two respective exercise groups. The other option
parameters are used as before. Then we calculated the implied subjective option values
using the mean volatility forecast of both the group of early and late exercisers.26 Using
24The correlation between both volatility measures and our proxy for wealth is -0.03 and highly insignificant, so we can
exclude the possibility that wealth is the driving causal factor behind our volatility result.
25The fact that the managers in our sample are only modestly risk averse and relatively well diversified is one of the
reasons why the convexity effect dominates the risk effect.
26We used this first approach as several individual parameters were missing for some managers in the two respective
group. Our results do not change if we use median forecasts instead. However, the difference in option values becomes a bit
smaller.
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this valuation approach, we find that the resulting subjective option value is 9.83 Euro for
the group of immediate exercisers and 10.14 Euro for the other group. The corresponding
time values were 1.83 Euro and 2.14 Euro, respectively. The numbers are reported in
Panel B of Table 7. We document the time values as they reflect the money the option
holders discard by exercising pre-maturely.
In the second approach, we calculated the implied option values for each manager individ-
ually. Despite the fact that this reduces the number of usable observations (21 individuals
in the first and 17 in the second group), we still find that the average subjective option
value of the managers that exercised immediately is lower than the value of those who
exercised later (9.73 Euro versus 9.84, respectively). The corresponding median values
are now 9.91 Euro and 9.95 Euro. However, we cannot detect a statistical difference be-
tween the values of the two groups which might be due to the small number of available
observations.
In summary, the calculated option values support the previous analysis of the observed ex-
ercises and further suggest that the undervaluation of volatilities induced earlier exercises.
Through this mechanism, expected volatilities are also related to value-cost wedge. The
fact that the subjective option values are relatively close to each other is consistent with
phenomenon that the exercise behavior in the firm’s option plan is generally clustered in
the first few exercise windows.
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6 Effects of Risk Aversion, Diversification and Other Variables
on Option Exercises
Having focused in the previous section on the effect of volatility forecasts on option exer-
cises, we now study the effects of other variables such as risk aversion or diversification. As
described earlier, models like those by Lambert et al. (1991) or Hall and Murphy (2000,
2002) predict that the group of instantaneous exercisers should exhibit a higher degree
of risk aversion (i.e. a higher value of α) and larger holdings of company stock (i.e. a
larger fraction of wealth invested in company stock). In our sample, we can neither detect
significant between-group differences in the degree of risk aversion (median value of 0.50
vs. 0.50; p-value = 0.4208) nor in the holdings of company stock (median value of 2.25%
vs. 1.25%; p-value = 0.5933). This result is surprising given that the vesting period has
forced risk averse and non-diversified individuals to postpone their exercises leading to an
accumulation in exercise activity at the end of the vesting period. The non-significance
of our risk aversion and diversification variables, however, might partially be due to the
generally low levels of these variables for our managers (see Section 4.2).
We argued that the amount of options granted to a manager can be considered as a
proxy for labor income and wealth. Lambert et al. (1991) model a manager’s absolute
risk aversion as a decreasing function of wealth, and they thereby showed that option
values are strictly increasing in wealth. Following this prediction, we expected wealthier
individuals to exercise their ESOs at later points in time (compared to less rich ones).
Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that the average number of granted options is
significantly lower for the group of individuals that exercised their ESOs immediately
compared to the group that exercised later (median value of 7,500 options vs. 10,000
options). The hypothesis that the two values are the same can be rejected at the 1%-level
(p-value = 0.0050). We further used tenure as a measure for the firm-specificity of human
capital. In general, we hypothesized that managers with more firm-specific human capital
(i.e. with a longer job tenure) exercise their options earlier to reduce their exposure to
the value of the firm. Our data, however, cannot confirm this conjecture.
We predicted that exercise decisions can be affected by expected stock returns. We argued
in Section 2 that option holders who are more optimistic about the movements in company
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stock will place higher values on their options, and should therefore exercise less early.
However, we are not able to confirm this empirically. We further predicted that mental
accounting, proxied by narrow bracketing and time horizon, can also partially affect ESO
exercises. We predicted that the less an individual integrates an ESO into his wealth, the
earlier he exercises it. Inconsistent with this conjecture, we find no significant difference
in the values of narrow bracketing between the two group of managers. However, the
second aspect of mental accounting seems to have some explanatory power: we find that
immediate exercisers have shorter perspectives with respect to price changes of company
stock (mean value of 0.77 vs. 1.05).
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7 Robustness Checks
The first part of this section is concerned with a possible non-response bias in our data.
22 out of 70 managers did not return our questionnaire. To investigate whether this
subgroup of individuals shows systematic differences in its behavior, we compare the
exercise activity of the responding subgroup with that of the non-responding one. In
total, 38% of all granted options were given to the 22 non-respondents. Table 9 compares
the distribution of exercises over the past five exercise windows for the 22 non-respondents
with those of the 48 respondents. It documents that the group of non-respondents shows
exercise patterns that are very similar to those of the responding group: exercise activity
is also clustered in the first window and very few ESOs were exercised in windows 3 to
8 (the high fraction of options exercised in the windows 6-8 of the non-respondents is
due to one person who exercised 30,000 options in window 7). In conclusion based on our
available information, we have no indication that the exercise behavior of the responding
individuals systematically differs from that of the non-responding ones.
Individuals might also exercise their ESOs because of tax considerations, or to satisfy liq-
uidity needs. To account for the possibility that observed exercise patterns were actually
driven by tax motivations, we asked all individuals to indicate to what extent the fol-
lowing statement provides a good description of their personal tax considerations: “Tax
considerations play an important role with respect to my exercise decisions within an
executive stock option program”. Answers were measured on a seven-point scale ranging
from 1 (“I totally disagree”) to 7 (“I totally agree”), see Question 4. The mean answer
to this question was 2 (median = 2.83, std.dev = 2.09), which suggests that tax delibera-
tions are a secondary consideration only and can be disregarded as an explanation of the
behavior in our data. Accounting for liquidity-motivated exercising is, however, more diffi-
cult. Individuals can rationally exercise their options because of liquidity needs if the time
value sacrificed by exercising is less than the cost of a loan. Liquidity needs are obviously
more severe for younger managers as they usually have lower salaries but higher expen-
ditures (see Dittmann and Maug, 2007). Therefore, we tested whether the subgroup of
immediate exercisers is significantly younger than the group that exercised at later points
in time. The average individual in the first group is 48.88 years old, while the average
manager in the second group is only slightly older (50.35 years). A non-parametric test
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(Mann-Whitney test) further shows that the difference between the two groups is highly
insignificant (p-value = 0.5053), indicating that liquidity-based exercising is probably also
not a driving factor in our data.
Private information and herd behavior might have affected the exercise decisions of the
individuals in our data set as well. Managers at lower levels might, for example, exercise
their ESOs after the public disclosure of exercises by board members, believing that this
group of individuals possesses superior information about the future performance of the
firm. We therefore checked the possibility that people imitated the exercise behavior of
board members and asked each individual to what extent his exercises were influenced by
the decisions of management board members. More precisely, we presented the following
pre-formulated question (see Question 6): “Knowing that board members have exercised
stock options influenced the timing of my exercise decision”. Answers again ranged from 1
(“I totally disagree”) to 7 (“I totally agree”). The average answer to this question was 1.95
(median = 1, std.dev. = 1.64) which suggests that imitating board members’ exercises
was only of minor importance. Furthermore, we cannot detect any significant price drops
in the days following extensive exercise activity. Such a price drop would be expected to
take place if the managers in our sample exploited private information in a favorable way.
In general, the structure of the ESO plan with a set of exercise windows that open only
after the public disclosure of company news (e.g. quarterly earnings) seem to deter the
profitable use of insider information.
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8 Conclusion
Using a unique data set, we studied the exercise behavior of managers within a particular
stock option plan, contributing to a deeper understanding of how individuals behave in
these programs. Our data set is uniquely comprehensive and detailed, but our study is
limited to one company, essentially making it a case study. We empirically addressed
questions on the efficiency of option grants and on the exercise behavior in an ESO plan.
All individuals in our data set are top managers and important decision makers in one of
the largest German corporations.
Our findings showed that the individuals exercise their options very early. A large majority
of option recipients sold the shares acquired on exercise. Our survey data documented that
the managers expect very low volatilities compared with historical estimates. These low
volatility estimates suggest that the usually assumed high volatility estimates in valuation
models might lead to an overestimation of the size of the value-cost wedge.
We provide evidence suggesting that differences in the exercise behavior are related to
differences in expected volatilities. In particular, we offer evidence implying that managers
who expect lower future stock price volatilities assign lower values to their stock options
and exercise earlier. The volatility results hold both for forecasts regarding company
stock and the stock market as a whole. We show that this finding is consistent with the
predictions of expected utility models using our managers’ survey parameters as inputs.
We cannot detect that the exercise activity in our data can be explained with differences
in measures of risk aversion and diversification. We perform various robustness checks to
account for non-response biases, liquidity and tax driven behavior as well as for herding
behavior and information-based exercises.
Regarding generalizations of our results, we are aware that our evidence is based on a
clinical analysis. The advantage is that we can hold the institutional and organizational
set-up of the firm and of the option plan constant in order to look at the effects of variations
in individual characteristics across managers. This is of particular relevance given the
large differences in ESO plans across institutions. However, it has the drawback that
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Table 1: Predicted Relationship Between Exercise Behavior and Individual Characteristics
This table reports predicted relationships between various individual-level variables and exercise behavior. “+” means that
an increase in the respective variable will result in a later exercise decision. Correspondingly, “-” means that an increase in























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Descriptive Results on Executive Behavior
This table summarizes descriptive results on individuals’ exercise and stock selling behavior. Panel A presents statistics on
the exercise behavior. It documents the number of employees that exercised (the majority of) their stock options in each
of the eight exercise windows, the number of options exercised by managers in the eight distinct exercise windows, and the
total number of exercise transactions executed by option holders. Panel B reports statistics on individuals’ stock selling
behavior. It shows whether or not the managers in the sample sold the shares they acquired on exercise and whether or
not they sold the shares they had to acquire prior to the participation in the stock option program (RSI shares). In total,
70 managers participated in the stock option program and 48 of these returned our questionnaire. For a discussion of a
potential non-response bias, see Subsection 7.
Panel A
Exercise Behavior
Number of managers Managers who exercised in window 1 45 (64.43%)
who exercised Managers who exercised in window 2 16 (22.85%)
Managers who exercised in window 3 4 (5.71%)
Managers who exercised in window 4 3 (4.29%)
Managers who exercised in window 5 0 (0.00%)
Managers who exercised in windows 6-8 2 (2.86%)
Number of options Options exercised in window 1 334,868 (52.54%)
exercised Options exercised in window 2 231,084 (31.38%)
Options exercised in window 3 58,098 (7.89%)
Options exercised in window 4 25,320 (3.44%)
Options exercised in window 5 0 (0.00%)
Options exercised in windows 6-8 35,034 (4.76%)
Number of exercises One exercise decision (] of empl.) 58 (82.86%)
Two exercise decisions (] of empl.) 9 (12.86%)
Three exercise decisions (] of empl.) 3 (4.38%)
Panel B
Stock Selling Behavior
Acquired Stock Shares sold (] of empl.) 41 (87.23%)
Shares not sold (] of empl.) 6 (12.77%)
Required Stock Investment Shares sold (] of empl.) 31 (64.58%)
Shares not sold (] of empl.) 17 (35.42%)
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Table 4: Cross Tables of Transaction Variables




Immediate No 3 14 17
exercise Yes 3 27 30
Total 6 41 47
Panel B
Required stock investment sold
No Yes Total
Immediate No 7 11 18
exercise Yes 10 20 30
Total 17 31 48
Panel C
Required stock investment sold
No Yes Total
Acquired No 4 2 6
stock sold Yes 12 29 41
Total 16 31 47
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics on Questionnaire Data
This table reports descriptive statistics on managerial risk aversion, company stockholdings (percentage of total wealth
invested in company stock), the number of options granted, the managers’ tenure, their forecasted volatilities (see Section 3
for details), their expected stock returns (see Section 3 for details), their degree of narrow bracketing, their time horizon (see
Section 3 for details) and their hierarchy level. Descriptive statistics are calculated on the basis of 48 returned questionnaires.
The table contains means, medians, standard deviations, minimums and maximums of all variables as well as the number
of observations of the respective variables (Obs.).
Variable Mean Median Std.dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Risk aversion 0.49 0.50 0.23 -0.16 0.77 43
Stockholdings (in %) 2.90 1.75 3.04 0.25 12.75 46
Options 10,520 10,000 11,435 1,000 50,000 70
Tenure (in years) 17.76 15.00 8.17 6.00 40.00 47
Forecasted volatility market (in %) 5.83 5.35 2.78 1.59 15.03 45
Forecasted volatility company (in %) 6.80 6.57 2.72 0.98 15.33 46
Expected return market (in %) 6.00 6.13 6.39 -12.86 19.71 43
Expected return company (in %) 7.37 6.76 4.87 -9.25 17.44 44
Narrow bracketing 1.78 1.00 1.56 1.00 7.00 46
Time horizon 0.89 1.00 0.48 0.00 2.00 46
Hierarchy 2.79 3.00 0.98 1.00 4.00 47
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Table 6: Volatility Forecasts
This table presents volatility forecasts for the DAX and EuroStoxx 50 indexes and for the company stock. Volatility forecasts
are calculated as described in Section 3. In addition, the table shows historical volatilities of non-overlapping 7 month returns,
the realized volatilities over the forecasting horizon (May to December 2004), and the fraction of individual forecasts for
which the realized values were outside the forecasted bounds. We calculated historical volatilities up to October 2004.
DAX Volatility Forecast (Mean) 5.75%
Number of Observations 45
Historical standard deviation 17.94%
(May 1987 - October 2004)
Realized Volatility 11.21%
Realized Value Outside Bound 40.0%
EuroStoxx 50 Volatility Forecast (Mean) 5.78%
Number of Observations 40
Historical standard deviation 15.45%
(May 1987 - October 2004)
Realized Volatility 9.94%
Realized Value Outside Bound 27.5%
Company Stock Volatility Forecast (Mean) 6.80%
Number of Observations 46
Historical standard deviation 30.32%
(May 1987 - October 2004)
Realized Volatility 15.41%
Realized Value Outside Bound 10.9%
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Table 7: Imputed Subjective Option Values and Volatility Forecasts
Panel A of this table presents average and median subjective option values based on the volatility forecasts of the managers
in the sample. For comparison, it also reports the Black-Scholes value (calculated based on a historical volatility estimate)
and the value-cost wedge. Volatility forecasts are calculated as described in Section 3. Panel B presents subjective option
values for the group of managers that immediately exercised their options and sold the acquired shares with the group of
managers that showed no immediate exercise activity (or who did not sell acquired shares). We use two different methods
to calculate the option values in this panel. In the first approach, we conducted the valuations using the median values of
risk aversion, diversification, and wealth for each of the two exercise groups as inputs. As further model inputs, we added
the time to maturity of the options, the exercise price, market price of company stock, an estimates of the risk free rate,
the firm’s beta, and the equity risk premium. Then we calculated the implied subjective option values using the mean
volatility forecast the group of early and late exercisers, respectively. In the second approach, we calculated the implied




Subjective Option Value Mean 9.79 EUR
Median 9.91 EUR
Black-Scholes Value 10.06 EUR




Group of managers Group of managers
who immediately exercised who did not exercise
and sold acquired shares immediately or who did
not sell acquired shares
Approach 1
Subjective Option Value 9.83 Euro 10.14 Euro
Subjective Time Value 1.83 Euro 2.14 Euro
Approach 2
Subjective Option Value 9.73 Euro 9.84 Euro
Subjective Time Value 1.73 Euro 1.84 Euro
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Table 8: Between Group Differences: The Exercise Behavior of Executives
This table compares descriptive statistics for the group of managers that immediately exercised their options and sold
the acquired shares with the group of managers that showed no immediate exercise activity (or who did not sell acquired
shares). The table contains means and medians of a large set of variables for the two groups. It further includes the number
of observations of the respective variables (Obs.). The last column contains p-values of a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum
test (Mann-Whitney test) comparing the median values of a certain variable for the two groups. The null hypothesis is that
the two groups are from populations with the same medians. * indicates significance at 10%; ** indicates significance at
5%; *** indicates significance at 1%.
Group of managers Group of managers p-value
who immediately exercised who did not exercise
and sold acquired shares immediately or who did
not sell acquired shares
Forecasted volatility Mean 5.05% 6.95% 0.0092**
market Median 4.60% 6.33%
Obs. 24 20
Forecasted volatility Mean 6.19% 7.66% 0.0771*
company Median 6.46% 6.57%
Obs. 24 21
Risk aversion Mean 0.52 0.47 0.4208
Median 0.50 0.50
Obs. 23 20
Stockholdings Mean 2.79 3.17 0.5933
Median 2.25 1.25
Obs. 26 19
Options Mean 8,419 11,190 0.0050***
Median 7,500 10,000
Obs. 26 21
Tenure Mean 17.27 18.03 0.9119
Median 15.00 13.50
Obs. 26 20
Expected return Mean 5.75% 6.22% 0.7432
market Median 6.19 6.03
Obs. 22 20
Expected return Mean 7.10% 7.68% 0.9033
company Median 7.65 6.76
Obs. 22 21
Narrow bracketing Mean 1.81 1.63 0.9663
Median 1.00 1.00
Obs. 26 19
Time horizon Mean 0.77 1.05 0.0518*
Median 1.00 1.00
Obs. 26 19




Table 9: Non-Response Bias: Respondents vs. Non-Respondents
This table contains the distribution of the options that were exercised in the different exercise windows by the 22 non-
respondents and compares it with the distribution of exercises for the 48 respondents of our questionnaire.
Exercise Window Respondents Non-Respondents
Options exercised in window 1: 53.47% 51.00%
Options exercised in window 2: 33.25 % 28.28%
Options exercised in window 3: 9.40% 5.41%
Options exercised in window 4: 2.80% 4.50 %
Options exercised in window 5: 0.00% 0.00%
Options exercised in windows 6-8: 1.09% 10.81%
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